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Abstract 
We examine the success of the privatization reform in China by evaluating the changes in 
performance of the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) after the Split-Share Structure reform in 
2005, considering the changes in ownership structure. This study investigates how the 
ongoing privatization process in China is affecting the performance of SOEs. Existing studies 
made in other economies confirm that private ownership has a positive impact on the 
performance of the SOEs in contrast to state ownership. The Split-Share Structure reform is 
the large event by the Chinese government in order to reach the establishment of a modern 
corporate system. The methodology utilized consists of a Random Effects panel analysis. The 
data covers annual data for 1135 firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange over a six-year period, ranging from 2003 to 2008. The result from 
this study shows that the state ownership ratio of Chinese SOEs have been decreasing after 
the reform was introduced in 2005. Further, the result implies significant improvements in 
performance of the SOEs after the reform. The result from this study also shows that private 
ownership is superior to state ownership in consideration to improvements in performance, 
since an increase in the state ownership ratio would lead to a decrease in the market value of 
the firm.  
 
 
Keywords: Split-Share Structure Reform, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), Ownership 
Structure, Corporate Governance, Privatization theory, China 
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1. Introduction 
One important reason behind the rapid economic growth seen in the emerging market of 
China during the last decades is the reform of the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) started in 
1978 (Sun and Tong, 2003). This study investigates the success of the privatization process by 
evaluating the changes in performance of the SOEs after the Split-Share Structure reform in 
2005, considering the changes in ownership structure. The Split-Share Structure reform in 
2005 is the latest move from the government in order to reach the establishment of a modern 
corporate system (Liao et al. 2014). The empirical evidence in this study is based on balanced 
panel data of 1135 listed firms in both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange between the years 2003-01-01 and 2008-12-31, generating 6810 observations in 
total.  
 
Previous studies about the effect of privatisation are many, but the results are divergent. 
Megginson and Neffer (2001) and Sun and Tong (2003) support the conclusion through their 
studies that private ownership are both more efficient and profitable than state ownership. In 
contrast, Chen et al. (2008) finds that state ownership can be superior under special 
conditions, such as a weak legal environment where the institutional situation is 
underdeveloped. In addition, Boubakri and Cosset (1998) suggest that state ownership can be 
superior when a country has a low economic growth rate and a low GDP per capita income.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the privatization reform in China differs in many 
parts from similar processes in other countries. The Chinese government has played an 
important role throughout the reform and therefore the SOE-reform in China is not a complete 
liberalization or democratization process (Sun and Tong 2003). The fact that the Chinese 
government still retains a substantial portion of the ownership and a dominant role in 
corporate decision-making, motivates the opportunity to examine this issue further. Also, the 
reform is said to be an important step for China to further develop their economy. Hou and 
Lee (2011) among others express the Split-Share Structure reform to be “one of the most 
significant institutional changes in the Chines stock market”. Hence, it makes it interesting to 
see in what sense and in what extend the privatization process in China of the SOEs have 
been successful or not. The result of this study will contribute to the already existing 
privatization theory and also fill the gap of deficiency empirical studies that consider the 
privatization process in China.  
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1.1 Research questions 
The following research questions are considered through this study: 
 
1.  Are there any significant improvements in performance of the SOEs in China after the 
Split-Share Structure reform in 2005? 
 
2.  Does state ownership has a less negative effect on performance of the SOEs after the Split-
Share Structure reform in 2005 than before the reform? 
1.2 Aim 
The aim of this study is to increase the understanding of how the ongoing privatization 
process in China is affecting the performance of SOEs on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. This study will analyse whether there are any significant 
improvements in performance of the SOEs in China after the Split-Share Structure reform in 
2005. This study will further consider if the state ownership have a less negative effect on 
performance of the SOEs after the Split-Share Structure reform in 2005 than before the 
reform. 
1.3 Hypothesis development 
To further study the effect of the Split-Share Structure reform in China in 2005, two 
hypotheses are developed. These are based on literature, theories and previous research on 
China, ownership structure and corporate governance. Both hypotheses are related to one 
unique coefficient each in the regression model. 
 
H1: After the Split-Share Structure reform, there have been significant improvements in 
performance of the SOEs in China. 
 
H2: After the Split-Share Structure reform, state ownership has a less negative effect on 
performance of the SOEs in China, than before the reform. 
 
We expect that the Split-Share Structure reform have had a positive effect on the performance 
of the SOEs. We further expect that the state ownership has had a less negative effect on 
performance of the SOEs after the reform was introduced in 2005, than before the reform. 
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1.4 Delimitations 
This study solely focuses on the Chinese stock market and the SOEs listed in either the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Moreover, the SOEs included in 
this study are only companies existing during the whole time period between 2003-01-01 and 
2008-12-31.  
1.5 Disposition 
The disposition of this study is organized as follow; the next section, section two, provides a 
review of prior literature over the privatization process in China. This section also includes a 
presentation of the ownership structure and the corporate governance in Chinese SOEs. 
Section two ends with a closer discussion of the research questions examined by this thesis 
and a closer hypothesis development. The third section presents data and the model for the 
statistical analysis, including variables and information about the regression models that will 
be used. The fourth section presents the empirical results, were the hypotheses are tested and 
analysed. In the fifth section, conclusions and suggestions for further research are presented. 
Finally, the last section presents the references used in this study followed by Appendix 1 and 
Appendix 2.  
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2. Literature and hypotheses 
2.1 China’s SOE-reform 
One important reason behind the rapid economic growth seen in the emerging market of 
China during the last decades is the reform of the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) started in 
1978 (Sun and Tong 2003). China´s SOE-reform officially begun through a regulation 
detected by the Communist Party of China (CPC). The reform had four main stages (Sun and 
Tong 2003), which are explained in more detail in Appendix 1. However, this privatization 
reform in China differs from other countries. First of all, the majority of the shares in the 
SOEs were kept by the government and thereby still untradeable on the stock market. Second, 
the issued shares were non-tradable, meaning the shares were not possible to trade on a 
secondary market (Liao et al. 2014). In addition, the reform does not follow the general 
approaches of privatization used in general market economies. The Chinese government has 
played an important role throughout the reform, therefore, the SOE-reform in China is not a 
complete liberalization or democratization process. Further, the Chinese government still 
retains a substantial portion of the ownership and a dominant role in the decision making 
process of the SOEs (Sun and Tong 2003).  
2.2 Ownership structure in Chinese companies  
In the early 1990s, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange were 
founded in order to encourage economic development by the opportunity for SOEs to obtain 
external funding (Hou and Lee, 2011). This marked the start of the Share Issue Privatization 
(SIP) process, in which SOEs went public to issue minority tradable shares to institutional and 
individual investors (Liao et al. 2014). Although the Chinese stock market has achieved a 
rapid development since the establishment of the stock exchanges, the Chinese stock market 
has a different regulation environment compared to other stock markets around the world. The 
stock market in China is not a Market-oriented mechanism; it is established by the 
government and regulated by a complex regulatory system. Furthermore, while many 
economies have been transformed from state ownership to private ownership in one step, this 
transition occurs gradually in China (Wang and Zhu, 2012).  
 
The SOEs in China can be listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. The SOEs can also have several types of shareholders, more specifically the 
state, legal person and other minority shares, which include employee shares, individual 
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domestic owners and foreign private owners (Delios et al. 2008). State shares imply holdings 
in the SOEs by the central government or the local governments. Legal person shares are 
instead owned by domestic institutions, which are either independent from or partially owned 
by the central or local government. Employee shares are only offered to employees of the 
listed company. These are normally limited in quantity and also issued at a substantial 
discount. The Chinese stock market consists of A-shares and B-shares. A-shares are mainly 
offered to the Chinese citizens and the domestic institutions, while B-shares are mainly 
offered to foreign individuals and institutional investors (Delios et al. 2008). 
 
The official classification scheme exhibit the general ownership structure in China and 
effectively divide the shareholders into three large groups, which are described above: state, 
legal person and other minority shares. Approximately these groups hold 30 % each of all 
shares in the listed SOEs even though this differ across firms and industries (Sun and Tong 
2003). According to the literature, the legal person shares and the other minority shares are 
considering to be owned by private individual or institutional investors, while state shares are 
considering to be owned by the government. However, it is important to note that this 
categorization of shares does not point out who the definitive owner of the SOE is, since the 
owner categories have unclear definitions. In fact, the government can actually own a SOE in 
China through both state shares and state-owned legal person shares. According to the 
categorization, these two types of state owners fall into the state share and the legal person 
share categories. This simple example proves the assertion and the ownership classification 
scheme fails in clarifying the identity of one type of legal person shareholder, which can 
actually be owned by the government (Delios et al. 2008).  
2.3 Corporate governance in Chinese companies  
The ownership structure has a severe impact on a firm’s corporate governance. Earlier 
literature treating this topic imply the possibility for larger shareholders to possess a positive 
role in corporate governance, as they with more power and knowledge can reduce the agency 
problem more effectively than minority shareholders (Noe, 2002). Incentives will arise when 
larger shareholders discover a larger cost from declines in the firm’s value than they could 
gain by divert the firm’s revenues to their own pockets. Also, Johnson et al. (2000) highlight a 
conflict of interest in the corporate governance theory called “tunneling”, where actions from 
the larger shareholders transfer assets and profits out of the firm for their own benefits, but at 
the expenses of the minority shareholders. 
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As listed SOEs in China still have a large degree of state ownership, these SOEs are still 
controlled by the government (Ding et al. 2007). However, instead of taking advantage of the 
corporate governance benefits of large shareholders, the high degree of state ownership is 
more likely to worsen the agency problem from the perspective of the minority shareholders. 
When the government is more interested in acquiring political credits, the private owners have 
instead strong interest in maximizing the profit of the firm and thereby increase the market 
value of the firm (Hou and Lee, 2011). 
 
Hou and Lee, (2011) emphasize the problematic in China when the SOEs have a high state-
owned ratio and the government thereby manage the firm both directly, through the 
implementation of the government policies, and indirectly, by the government’s influence 
over the management team. This creates incentives to collude with managers to divert 
resources from the SOE to gain their own objectives, at the expense of the private owners. 
Existing studies (Jiang et al. 2010) present evidence of this by the so-called inter-corporate 
loans, a large issue in China between 1996 and 2006, where funds where transferred from the 
listed company to benefit the larger shareholder. As expressed by Jiang et al. (2010), “Most of 
these loans did not accrue interest, and even when some interest was accrued, neither the 
interest nor the principal was typically ever paid back”.  
2.4 The Split-Share Structure reform in China 
As a second step of the privatization process in China, the Split-Share Structure reform was 
formed in 2005. The main target of the Split-Share Structure reform was to further liberalize 
state-owned shares into full circulation (Liao et al. 2014). Before the reform these shares 
could not be traded in the stock exchange. The reform is often referred to as a socio-political 
ideology of China. On the one hand, the government wished to maintain its influence in listed 
SOEs, in order to achieve political and social objectives. On the other hand, the government 
also wanted their controlled SOEs to reduce their dependence on state subsidies and increase 
their ability to raise capital through the equity market (Hou and Lee, (2011). 
 
An earlier attempt to accomplish this was made in 2001, but with unsuccessful result. In the 
first attempt, the shares of Chinese listed SOEs were classified into restricted and freely 
traded shares. There were two kinds of restricted shares: state shares and legal person shares. 
These could not be freely traded in the Chinese stock exchanges. The restricted shares could 
only be transferred with the authorities´ approval or through auction. The fact that these 
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shares remained restricted even after the transfer or auction made them untradeable on the 
stock exchanges. Due to this model, the first attempt of the Split-Share Structure reform 
reduced the quality of the SOEs’ corporate governance and the efficiency of their 
performance. This means exactly the opposite of what was the purpose of the reform (Hou 
and Lee, 2011).  
 
To accommodate further economic development, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CRSC) announced on 29 April 2005 its decision to mandate the elimination of 
the trading constraints imposed on all restricted shares in order to reach a more modernize 
capital market (Hou and Lee 2011). Now, all shares of Chinese listed SOEs were transformed 
into tradable shares by gradually removing the legal and technical obstacle of transferring 
shares to public investors. This was a negotiation process and the changes occurred gradually 
with the start in the end of 2005 (Hou and Lee 2011). The goal was that all restricted shares 
would become fully tradable in the stock market in 2008, three years after the announcement 
by the CRSC. By removing the restrictions on the earlier non-tradable shares, a secondary 
market was opened up (Liao et al. 2014).  
2.5 Privatization theory 
The world has during the last decades observed a global shift away from state socialism 
towards entrepreneurial capitalism in the most developed economies. This by selling out their 
SOEs to private investors in hope that the earlier unsatisfied result would improve by private 
ownership (Megginson et al. 1994). Studies about the effect of privatization are many and the 
result tends to be divergent.  
 
Megginson and Neffer (2001) highlight that ”privatization is one of the most important 
elements of the continuing global phenomenon of the increasing use of markets to allocate 
resources”. In their empirical study they have investigated the fast growing literature on 
privatization to find proof on its effects. As a result, Megginson and Neffer (2001) research 
support the conclusion that privately owned companies are both more efficient and profitable 
than state owned SOEs. Further, Sun and Tong (2003) evaluate in their empirical study 
whether performance has changed after the Share Issue Privatization (SIP) in China during 
the period 1994-1998. Their findings are that “SIP is effective in improving SOEs‘ earnings 
ability, real sales, and workers’ productivity but is not effective in improving profit returns 
and leverage after privatization.” Furthermore, they conclude that state ownership had a 
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negative effect on the firm’s performance while legal person shares had a positive effect on 
the firm’s performance after the SIP. This implies that private ownership acts different from 
state ownership (Sun and Tong 2003).  
 
In contrast, Chen et al. (2008) argues, “In a transitional economy with a weak legal 
environment, the governance mechanisms of state and private ownership are different from 
those in either a planned economy or a developed market economy.” In their article they find 
that state ownership has advantages under these conditions and could be superior to private 
ownership, especially when the institutional situation is undeveloped and when the 
enforcement by the law is quite weak (Chen et al. 2008). Also, Boubakri and Cosset (1998) 
findings are consistent with the above statement. Further, they suggest that state ownership 
can be superior when a country has a low economic growth rate and a low GDP per capita 
income. Competent managers, entrepreneurs and capital, are said to be the main ingredients 
for a successful privatization. According to Boubakri and Cosset (1998), a country that lack of 
these ingredients will not benefit from a privatization program. 
2.6 Hypothesis development and expected results  
In this section the hypotheses is developed to examine the effect of the privatization of the 
SOEs in China after the Split-Share Structure reform in 2005. Earlier privatization theories 
(Megginson et al., 1994) and (Megginson and Neffer, 2001) support the conclusion through 
their studies that privately owned companies are both more efficient and profitable than state-
owned SOEs. In addition, Sun and Tong (2003) analysis over the SIP process in 1994 
conclude that state ownership had a negative impact on the performance of the SOEs. As a 
result from the Split-Share Structure reform, all shares of the Chinese listed SOEs were 
transformed into tradable shares by gradually removing the legal and technical obstacle of 
transferring shares to public investors (Hou and Lee 2011). A secondary market was then 
opened up and the restricted shares became fully tradable in the stock market a couple of 
years after the reform in 2005 (Liao et al. 2014). Furthermore, the reform is said to be an 
important step for China to further develop their economy. Hou and Lee (2011) among others 
express the Split-Share Structure reform to be “one of the most significant institutional 
changes in the Chines stock market”. Hence, it makes it interesting to see in what sense and in 
what extend the privatization process of the SOEs in China have been successful or not. 
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To study the effect of the Split-Share Structure reform in China in 2005, the following 
hypotheses are developed: 
 
H1: After the Split-Share Structure reform, there have been significant improvements in 
performance of the SOEs in China. 
 
Also, the effect of the ownership structure on the performance of the SOEs will be 
considered. To examine the existence of a privatization effect of the Split-Share Structure 
reform, the second hypothesis is developed:  
 
H2: After the Split-Share Structure reform, state ownership has a less negative effect on 
performance of the SOEs in China, than before the reform. 
 
To test the hypothesis stated above, the regression model presented below will be used: 
 Tobin´s  q =∝ +β!PM!" + β!DR!" + β!logSales!" + β!logGDP!" + β!SOR!" + β!D06!" + β!(D06!"×SOR!") + u!" 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
To conduct this study both a qualitative and a quantitative approach have been used. The 
qualitative approach consists of collected data through databases to the literature section, the 
hypotheses development section and the methodology section in this study. When gathering 
this data, the following online databases were used: Business Source Premier, Emerald, 
CSMAR, Science Direct, GUPEA, Libris, and Google Scholar. Frequently used search words 
were: “Split-Share Structure Reform”, “State-Owned Enterprises” (SOEs), “Ownership 
Structure”, “Corporate Governance”, “Privatization Theory” and most of them in combination 
with “China”. The used articles for this study have all been published in professional 
magazines and academic journals. Most of these articles have also been previewed before 
published.  
 
Furthermore, the quantitative approach consists of the numerical data used in this study. This 
data have been collected from the Chinese database CSMAR. The data consists of 1135 
companies, which are all listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock 
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Exchange in China. Table 1 below presents the distribution of the firms by industry 
classification.  
Table 1. Distribution of 1135 firms by industry classification 
  Industry N of Firms    % of Total Sample   
Commerce 119 
 
10.49% 
 
Conglomerates 43 
 
3.79% 
 
Industrials 722 
 
63.61% 
 Properties 119 
 
10.48% 
 
Public Utility 132 
 
11.63% 
 Total 1135   100%   
 
The data have been collected on a yearly basis from 2003-01-01 to 2008-12-31, generating 
6810 observations in total. The announcement of the Split-Share Structure reform was made 
in the end of April 2005. However, this was a negotiation process and the changes occurred 
gradually with the start in the end of 2005 (Hou and Lee 2011). Therefore, an effect of the 
reform could not be seen before 2006. The time period was selected from 2003 to 2008, in 
order to estimate whether a significant effect on the performance of the SOEs has occurred 
due to the reform. The variable Tobin´s q is used as the dependent variable in the regression 
model. The explanatory variables are Profit Margin, Debt Ratio, logSales, logGDP, State-
Ownership Ratio, Dummy2006 and Dummy2006xState-Ownership Ratio. Data on these 
multiples have all been collected from the CSMAR database directly, apart from the State-
Ownership Ratio that was calculated manually using excel. Firms that did not exist during the 
whole period between 2003-01-01 and 2008-12-31 have been excluded to avoid unbalanced 
data. In addition, all financial firms have been excluded, as their financial data are not 
comparable to other firms. Finally, to avoid misleading results derived from outliers, extreme 
values have been excluded in the data.  
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Dependent variables 
After investigating similar studies and articles made in the area, the variables used in this 
study were decided on. The dependent variable, Tobin’s q, has been used to capture 
improvements in performance of the SOEs after the Split-Share Structure reform in 2005. 
Tobin’s q is the total market value of a firm divided by the total asset value. A Tobin´s q 
value between zero and one implies that the firm is undervalued, i.e. that it costs more to 
replace the firm’s assets than the firm is worth. A value above one implies that the firm is 
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overvalued and worth more than the costs of its assets. A high Tobin’s q value therefore 
implies a more profitable firm. We argue that Tobin’s q is the best measure to use to estimate 
future growth and performance opportunities. 
3.2.2 Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables included in this study are Profit Margin (PM), Debt Ratio (DR), 
logSales, logGDP, State-Ownership Ratio (SOR), Dummy2006 (D06) and 
Dummy2006xState-Ownership Ratio (D06xSOR). The variables, PM, DR, logSales, logGDP 
and SOR are used as control variables in our regression model. The variable PM is a ratio of 
profitability. The higher value, the more profitable has the firm been. We argue that PM is the 
past growth experience and thereby affect the Tobin’s q, which estimates future growth. 
Furthermore, PM was used instead of the profitability multiples, ROE and ROA. According to 
Sun and Tong (2003), listed companies in China have the right to issue up to 30% of 
outstanding stocks annually after their listings at the stock exchange. A large amount of the 
SOEs are taking advantages of this rule and the multiples ROE and ROA would therefore be 
incorrectly interpreted if these were included in the regression model. 
 
Moreover, DR is a proxy for firm leverage. This variable is used to control for possible effects 
from leverage. Since a large amount of the Chinese SOEs has issues regarding high debt 
ratios (Sun and Tong 2003), this is an important variable to include in our regression model. 
Further, the variable logSales, the natural logarithm of revenues, is a proxy for firm size. 
Larger SOEs tends to have a larger market share and thereby more market power. On the 
other hand, large SOEs encounter more government bureaucracy and larger agency problems, 
which are adverse to a firm´s performance. Hence, this makes logSales, an important variable 
to include in our regression models. In addition, the variable logGDP, the natural logarithm of 
GDP, is included in our regression model. Since the Chinese economy is rapidly growing, 
GDP is an important variable to include in order to control for general changes in economic 
activities through time. Both revenues and GDP are set to logarithmic form in order to narrow 
the variables range (Wooldridge 2013, s.157). Furthermore, the variable State-Ownership 
Ratio shows the proportion of firm shares owned by the government.  
 
In addition, D06 is a dummy variable that captures improvements in performance of the SOEs 
after the Split-Share Structure reform in 2005. The dummy variable is set to 2006, as an effect 
of the reform could not be seen before 2006. The variable D06 equals one if the year is 2006 
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or afterwards and zero if the year is before 2006. This variable will thereby answer the first 
research question in this study. Further, the variable D06xSOR is an interaction term 
including the variable D06 times SOR. The interaction term captures if the change in state 
ownership has an effect on performance of the SOEs after the Split-Share Structure reform in 
2005 and will thereby answer the second research question in this study. 
 
The measurement of the variables are presented in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2. Measurement of 
variables     
Variables 
Regression 
Model Measurement 
Tobin´s q Tobin´s q Total market value of firm divided by total asset value 
Profit Margin PM Net income divided by sales 
Debt Ratio DR Total debt divided by total assets 
logSales logSales The natural logarithm of annual sales revenue 
logGDP logGDP The natural logarithm of gross domestic product 
State-Ownership Ratio  SOR State shares divided by total shares of a firm 
 
 
Dummy2006 D06 
Dummy variable = 1 if data collected after 2006, dummy 
variable = 0 before 2006 
 
Dummy2006xState-
Ownership Ratio D06xSOR 
Interaction term, dummy variable for year 2006 times State-
Ownership Ratio 
 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Panel Data 
The data used in this study is called panel data. Panel data, also referred to as longitudinal 
data, is a special type of data in which the same cross-sectional unit, i.e. a firm, is observed 
over a given time period. At each time period, the same unit is observed. This provides useful 
information on dynamics of the observed unit (Gujarati and Porter s.591, 2009). Panel data 
can be either balanced or unbalanced. Balanced panel data includes all observations, i.e. each 
variable are observed for each unit and each time period. Unbalanced panel data is instead a 
panel that includes missing values (Stock and Watson s.350-351, 2007). The data used in this 
study contains no missing values and is therefore considered to be of a balanced character. 
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One can say that panel data is a combination of cross-sectional and time-series data. This 
leads to several advantages when using panel data before cross-sectional or time-series data. 
First, panel data will give more reliable results, as it includes more informative data, less 
collinearity among variables and uses more degrees of freedom. Second, by studying repeated 
cross-sectional observations, panel data are better suited to study the dynamics of change in 
each unit. Third, the use of panel data enables studies of more complicated behavioural 
models. Despite these advantages, panel data also pose several estimation and interpretation 
problems. Problems that troubles cross-sectional data (e.g., heteroskedasticity) and time-series 
data (e.g., autocorrelation) need to be addressed also in this panel data, as panel data involve 
both these dimensions. Several estimation techniques can be used in order to address for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The two most prominent are the Breusch-Pagan 
Specification test to identify heteroskedasticity and the Wooldridge test to identify 
autocorrelation (Gujarati and Porter s. 592, 2009). This will be further explained in coming 
sections.  
3.3.2 Pooled Panel Model 
To estimate a Pooled Panel model would be the simplest way to deal with panel data. The 
approach to estimate this model would be to pool all data in the dataset, both the cross-
sectional observations and the time-series observations, in a single equation. This approach 
would imply a possibility to estimate the regression model using a regular OLS model 
(Brooks s. 488, 2008).  
 
However, using a regular OLS model would result in some severe limitations and specific 
models must to be applied to deal with these limitations. These will be presented further, but 
first, the limitations due to using the OLS model need to be investigated. First, and most 
importantly, pooling the data will indirectly assume that the relationship between the 
variables and the average values of the variables are constant over time and across all units in 
the sample (Brooks s. 488, 2008). It can also be noted that, since the pooled OLS model relies 
on a between units comparison, the estimates from the Pooled Panel model tend to be greatly 
biased due to unobserved heterogeneity, 𝑢!" and 𝑥!" are correlated in the model. To solve for 
the unobserved heterogeneity, specific techniques have to be applied and these will be 
presented in sections below (Baltagi, 2005). 
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The Pooled Panel regression is presented below (Brooks s. 487, 2008):  
 𝑦!" =  ∝ +𝛽𝑥!" + 𝑢!" 
 
When describing panel data, it is important to have some additional notation to observe both 
the unit observed and the time period at which the unit is observed. Above, the subscript 𝑖 
refers to the 𝑖 numbers of cross-sectional observation and 𝑡 refers to the 𝑡 numbers of time 
period at which it is observed. The variable 𝑦!" is the dependent variable, for the 𝑖 firms at 
time period 𝑡. The variable ∝ is the intercept term, 𝛽 is a 𝑘-times-1 vector of parameters to be 
estimated on the explanatory variables, and 𝑥!" is a 𝑘-times-1 vector of observations on the 
explanatory variables for the 𝑖 firm at the 𝑡 time period. Finally, the 𝑢!" denotes a 𝑘-times-1 
vector of parameters to be estimated on the explanatory variables (Brooks s. 488, 2008).  
3.3.3 Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test 
The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test was used in this study to test whether the 
estimated variances of the residuals from the stated regression model are dependent on the 
values of the explanatory variables. More specifically, it tests for heteroskedasticity in the 
regression model (Wooldridge s.222, 2013). The null hypothesis suggests that the variances 
across units are zero, i.e. there are no random effects, no significant differences across units, 
and no heteroskedasticity in the model. If the null hypothesis is rejected there is an 
appearance of heteroskedasticity in the model. This has to be corrected for in order to avoid 
misleading interpretation of the t-values. Heteroskedsticity can be corrected by using robust 
standard errors. Under the null hypothesis, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier Test 
follows a chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom (Gujarati and Porter s. 605, 
2009). The equation for this test is presented below (Baltagi, 2005):  
 𝜆 = 𝑛𝑇2 𝑇 − 1 ( 𝑢!")!!!!!!!!! 𝑢!"!!!!!!!!! − 1  𝑎𝑛𝑑  ~𝑥!! 
 𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝐻!: 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝜀!" = 0  
 
If the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, there are no heteroskedasticity in the model and the 
regular Pooled Panel model can be used. 
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3.3.4 Wooldridge Test 
The Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data was used in this study to investigate 
whether serial correlation occurs in the regression model or not. Serial correlation occurs in a 
panel data model when the errors in different time periods are correlated. The null hypothesis 
states that there is no serial correlation in the model, and a failure to reject the null hypothesis 
would imply that the errors in different time periods are not correlated (Wooldridge s.334-
339, 2013). 
3.3.5 Fixed Effects Model 
Since the Pooled Panel model causes some severe limitations regarding the estimation of the 
pooled equation, the Fixed Effects model and the Random Effects model were used in order 
to deal with these limitations. The main difference between the two is that the Fixed Effects 
model, unlike the Random Effects model, allows arbitrary correlation between the variation 
across units and explanatory variables included in the model (Wooldridge s. 398, 2013). 
 
To understand how the Fixed Effects model works, the Pooled Panel regression is presented 
below were the error term,  𝑢!", is decomposed into a unit specific effect,  𝑎!, and a “reminder 
disturbance”,  𝑣!", which varies over time and between units (Brooks s. 490-491, 2008): 
 𝑦!" =  ∝ +𝛽𝑥!" + 𝑢!" 𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝑢!" = 𝑎! + 𝑣!"  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑎! = 0 
 
The unit specific effect, 𝑎!, includes all of the variables that affect 𝑦!" cross-sectionally, but 
do not change over time and the “reminder disturbance”, 𝑣!", captures everything that is left 
unexplained about 𝑦!" (Brooks s. 491, 2008). 
 
The Fixed Effects model controls for variables that differ across units but are constant over 
time and can be used for multiple time periods (Gujarati and Porter s. 356, 2009). So, if one 
expects that something within the unit may impact or bias the predictor, the Fixed Effects 
model should be used, as the Fixed Effects model will control for this. This explains why the 
unit specific effect,  𝑎!, is said to be zero in the regression above. The Fixed Effects model will 
remove the effect of all time-invariant characteristics from the predictor variables and only 
the predictors “net” effect will be assessed. The fixed effects approach proposes different 
intercepts for each unit. These intercepts are constant over time and the relationships between 
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the explanatory variables and the dependent variables are assumed to be the same, both cross-
sectionally and temporally (Brooks s. 491, 2008). 
3.3.6 Random Effects Model 
The Random Effects model is an alternative to the Fixed Effects model and is in general used 
when there is a reason to expect that differences across units influence the dependent variable. 
The regression for the Random Effects model are presented below (Brooks s. 498, 2008):  
 𝑦!" =  ∝ +𝛽𝑥!" + 𝑢!" 𝑤𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝑢!" = 𝑎! + 𝑣!" 
 
The Random Effects model includes all the Fixed Effects assumptions plus the additional 
requirement that the unit specific effect,  𝑎!, is independent of all explanatory variables in all 
time periods, whether they are fixed over time or not (Wooldridge s. 395, 2013). As for the 
Fixed Effects model, the Random Effects approach proposes different intercepts for each unit. 
Again, these intercepts are constant over time and the relationships between the explanatory 
variables and the dependent variables are assumed to be the same, both cross-sectionally and 
temporally. However, Brooks (2008) states that the difference is that under the Random 
Effects model, the intercepts for each cross-sectional unit are assumed to emerge from a 
common intercept,  ∝, plus a random variable, 𝑎!, that varies cross-sectionally, but is constant 
over time. More specifically, the unit specific effect, 𝑎!, measures the random deviation of the 
intercept term of each unit from the so-called “global” intercept term, ∝. The assumptions 
behind the new cross-sectional error term, 𝑎!, is as follow; 𝑎! has zero mean, is independent 
of the individual observation error term, 𝑣!", has constant variance and is independent of the 
explanatory variables in the model (Brooks s. 498, 2008). This explains why the 𝑎! term is not 
set to zero in this model, but in the Fixed Effects model.  
3.3.7 Differences between the Random Effects and the Fixed Effects Model 
One advantage of using the Random Effects model over the Fixed Effects model is that it 
allows for explanatory variables that are constant over time. In the Fixed Effects model, the 
time-invariant variables are absorbed by the different intercepts (Wooldridge s. 395, 2013). 
However, some time-invariant variables that might influence the predictor variables may be 
unavailable and if these are not specified in the Random Effects model, it will lead to an 
omitted variable bias in the model (Wooldridge s. 397, 2013).  
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Furthermore, the Random Effects model estimates coefficients of time-invariant variables and 
the Fixed Effects model controls for those time-invariant variables, but will not estimate them 
directly. On the other hand, the Fixed Effects model controls for all time-invariant variables, 
whereas the Random Effects model can estimate only the time-invariant variables that are 
included in the model (Gujarati and Porter s. 607, 2009). Since the approach of the Random 
Effects model does not remove the time-invariant variables, the impact of these variables can 
be enumerated. Also, the Random Effects model uses more degrees of freedom and therefore 
produces more efficient estimates than the Fixed Effects model. However, the Random 
Effects model has one major drawback. The model is only valid when the composite error 
term,  𝑢!", is uncorrelated with all of the explanatory variables. This is not the case in the Fixed 
Effects model where arbitrary correlation between the variation across units and explanatory 
variables are allowed as mentioned earlier (Brooks s. 600, 2008).  
3.3.8 Hausman Specification Test 
Generally, the Hausman Specification test is used when two models can be applied to answer 
the same question: the Fixed Effects model vs. the Random Effects model in this study. The 
Hausman Specification test formally tests for statistically significant differences in the 
coefficients on the time-varying explanatory variables between the two models. If the 
Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis the Random Effects model is the one 
appropriate to use to estimate the regression. In practice, a failure to reject the null hypothesis 
means that the sampling variation is so large in the Fixed Effects estimates that it is not 
possible to conclude any significant differences that are statistically significant. Also, one 
reason can be that the Random Effects estimates and the Fixed Effects estimates are so close 
that it does not matter which one to use or that the key assumption behind the Random Effects 
model (𝑎! is uncorrelated with each explanatory variable) is false. If this assumption does not 
hold, and the null hypothesis is rejected and the Fixed Effects estimates should be used 
(Wooldridge s. 399, 2013).  
 𝐻 = 𝛽!" − 𝛽!" 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽!" − 𝛽!") !! 𝛽!" − 𝛽!"   𝑎𝑛𝑑  ~  𝑥!!!!  
      
This test statistic follows a chi-squared distribution, under the null hypothesis, with k-1 
degrees of freedom. k is the number of time-varying explanatory variables in the model.  
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Even if the Breusch-Pagan Multiplier test and the Hausman Specification test are utilized, 
Wooldridge (2013) emphasizes the importance of computing all the three regression models: 
the Pooled Panel model, the Fixed Effects model and the Random Effects model. This 
because a comparison between the sets of estimates can help to determine the nature of the 
biases caused by leaving the unobserved effect,  𝑎!, entirely in the error term (as the Pooled 
Panel model or partially as the Random Effects model). However, it is important to note that 
even if the unit specific effect,  𝑎!, is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables in all time 
periods, the standard errors and the t-statistics of the Pooled Panel model are generally 
invalid. This is because they ignore the often considerable serial correlation in the composite 
errors, 𝑢!" = 𝑎! + 𝑣!" (Wooldridge s. 397, 2013)  
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4. Empirical results and analysis 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the variables 
Table 3 below presents the descriptive statistics for the included variables in the regression 
model. The mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of all variables are 
presented. The descriptive statistics are based on the adjusted data set including 1135 listed 
companies in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, generating 
6810 observations in total. The data have been collected on a yearly basis from 2003-01-01 to 
2008-12-31.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables       
Variables Mean  Std.Dev Min Max 
Tobin´s q 1.445 0.584 0.990 7.182 
     PM 0.032 0.258 -3.442 3.830 
     DR 0.515 0.211 0.009 2.424 
     logSales 21.936 1.335 16.483 26.657 
     logGDP 12.227 0.287 11.819 12.657 
     SOR 0.312 0.244 0.000 0.971 
     D06 0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000 
     D06xSOR 0.133 0.206 0.000 0.971 
N: 6810 
   n: 1135 
   T: 6     
 
As can be seen in Table 3 above, the dependent variable Tobin´s q has a minimum value of 
approximately one and a maximum value of 7.182. These are reasonable numbers, as a 
Tobin´s q value should not go below one. If the value is below one, it implies that the firm is 
undervalued, i.e. that it costs more to replace the firm´s assets than the firm is worth. The 
maximum value of 7.182 shows that there are Chinese SOEs which are very profitable and 
thereby overvalued.  
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The explanatory variable PM has a minimum value of -3.442 and a maximum value of 3.830, 
which shows that Chinese SOEs can have both large deficits and large profits. The 
explanatory variable DR has a minimum value of 0.009 and a maximum value of 2.424, 
which is far above 100%. This makes China an exceptional case and clearly shows China´s 
large issue regarding high debt ratios of the SOEs (Sun and Tong 2003). The explanatory 
variable logSales has a minimum value of 16.483 and a maximum value of 26.657. These 
values are presented in log-form and shows that there are both larger and smaller SOEs 
existing in China. The explanatory variable logGDP has a minimum value of 11.819 and a 
maximum value of 12.657. These values are also presented in log-form and shows that the 
GDP value has changed during the studied time period. The explanatory variable SOR has a 
minimum value of zero and a maximum value of 0.971. This indicates that there exists 100% 
privately owned SOEs in China and also that the highest state ownership ratio of all studied 
SOEs is 97.1%. The explanatory variable D06 equals zero if the year is before 2006 and one 
if the year is 2006 or afterwards. Finally, the explanatory variable D06xSOR has a minimum 
value of zero and a maximum value of 0.971. This shows that SOEs included in this study are 
between 100% privately owned and 97.1% state-owned after year 2006.  
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables over the studied time period are also presented in 
Appendix 2, followed by more detailed explanations regarding the variables changes over 
time. 
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4.2 Pair-wise Correlation Matrix 
The explanatory variables in the regression model are not only likely to be correlated with the 
dependent variable, but also with each other. The Pair-wise Correlation Matrix in Table 4 
below presents the correlation coefficients of all variables included in the regression model 
used in this study. If the correlation between two variables exceeds 0.9, a problem of 
multicollinearity arises (Woolridge, 2013). This is a statistical problem that needs to be dealt 
with. As seen in Table 4 below, none of the explanatory variables has a correlation that 
exceeds 0.9. This indicates that the set of explanatory variables does not suffer from the 
multicollinearity problem. 
 
Table 4. Pair-wise Correlation Matrix 
   
      
Variables Tobin´s q PM DR logSales logGDP SOR D06 D06xSOR 
Tobin´s q 1.0000 
       
PM 0.0428 1.0000 
      
DR -0.0818 -0.2777 1.0000 
     
logSales -0.1839 0.2138 0.1132 1.0000 
    
logGDP 0.2918 0.0163 0.1435 0.1902 1.0000 
   
SOR -0.1731 0.0862 -0.0916 0.1761 -0.1977 1.0000 
  
D06 0.3029 0.0121 0.1319 0.1617 0.8731 -0.1848 1.0000 
 
D06xSOR 0.0984 0.0506 0.0537 0.2347 0.5312 0.3744 0.6459 1.0000 
 
4.3 Regression results 
By testing the Pooled Panel regression model for serial correlation, using the Wooldridge test 
for serial correlation, we could conclude that the model did not suffer from this type of 
correlation. The null hypothesis failed to be rejected, i.e. no autocorrelation could be 
concluded in the regression. However, by using the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test 
the appearance of heteroskedasticity could be concluded in the model. To correct for 
heteroskedasticity we used robust standard errors. 
 
The Hausman Specification test implied that the Random Effects model was the most 
appropriate model to use to estimate our regression. Since, the null hypothesis failed to be 
rejected in this test. As seen in Table 5 below, the coefficients for the Random Effects model 
are the ones most significant between the Fixed Effects model and the Random Effects model. 
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This further proves the result of the Hausman test. However, Wooldridge (2013) emphasizes 
the importance of computing all the three regression models: the Pooled Panel model, the 
Fixed Effects model and the Random Effects model. We have therefore computed all these 
regression models, the results of which are presented in Table 5 below. Note that all models 
have been adjusted using robust standard errors to correct for the appearance of 
heteroskedasticity.  
Table 5. Estimation results 
      
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3)   
  Fixed-effects   Random-effects   Pooled 
 Variables Tobin´s q   Tobin´s q   Tobin´s q   
       PM 0.125*** 
 
0.144*** 
 
0.156*** 
 
 
(0.0579) 
 
(0.0521) 
 
(0.0267) 
 
DR -0.216*** 
 
-0.245*** 
 
-0.255*** 
 
 
(0.0996) 
 
(0.0699) 
 
(-0.0812) 
 
logSales -0.0417*** 
 
-0.0935*** 
 
-0.103*** 
 
 
(0.0222) 
 
(0.0105) 
 
(-0.0935) 
 
logGDP 0.251*** 
 
0.305*** 
 
0.316*** 
 
 
(0.0336) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.0406) 
 
SOR -0.0753 
 
-0.0812** 
 
-0.0804** 
 
 
(0.0704) 
 
(0.0329) 
 
(0.0401) 
 
D06 0.328*** 
 
0.318*** 
 
0.311*** 
 
 
(0.022) 
 
(0.0214) 
 
(0.0277) 
 
D06xSOR  -0.293*** 
 
-0.267*** 
 
-0.247*** 
 
 
(0.0618) 
 
(0.0621) 
 
(0.0487) 
 
Constant -0.703 
 
-0.206 
 
-0.141 
 
 
(0.421) 
 
(0.351) 
 
(0.482) 
                      Weighted statistics       
Observations 6810 
 
6810 
 
6810 
 R-squared (Overall) 0.1606 
 
0.1766 
 
0.1761 
 Rho 0.3563 
 
0.2624 
   Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test: Chibar2 (01) = 1157.43     Prob > Chibar2 = 0.0000 
Wooldridge test for Autocorrelation: F (1, 1134) = 1.739    Prob > F = 0.1876  
Hausman Test: Chi2 (6) = 0.78    Prob > Chi2 = 0.9925  
1. Std. errors are presented in parentheses. 
     2. *, **, *** Denote a significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level or better. 
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4.3.1 Interpretation of the ownership structure ratio 
The fact that the general ownership structure in the Chinese SOEs, despite the privatization 
reform, still consists of three large groups of shareholders, the state, legal person and other 
minority shares, makes the feature of China's privatization process unique (Sun and Tong 
2003). The Chinese government still retains a substantial proportion of the ownership. 
Diagram 1 below shows the mean value of the State-Ownership Ratio of all listed Chinese 
SOEs on both the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the 
time period 2003 to 2008. Despite the substantial proportion of state ownership of the SOEs, a 
clear negative trend is seen in the State-Ownership Ratio where the mean value in 2003 has 
decreased from 0.368 to 0.235 in 2008. This implicates a decline of the proportion of state-
owned shares in the Chinese SOEs. The largest decline is seen after 2005, which implicates 
an effect of the Split-Share Structure reform in 2005, where the state ownership has decreased 
due to the reform. 
 
 Diagram 1. State-Ownership Ratio 	  	  
	  
4.3.2 Interpretation of the Random Effects Model 
A regression study was used in order to consider whether the improvements over time, after 
the Split-Share Structure reform, are due to changes in the ownership structure of the SOEs. 
As mentioned, the Random Effects model is the superior one according to the Hausman 
Specification test (p>0,05), so the coefficients of the Random Effects model are the ones we 
will focus on in this study.  
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According to the Random Effects regression, the R2 overall value is 0.1766. This means that 
the model explains 17.66% of the variance around the dependent variable, Tobin's q. The F-
value of the model is strongly significant with a p-value of 0.0000. This implies that the 
variables included in the model are all valid. Wooldridge (2013) highlights the importance of 
discussing whether the regression model suffers from problems of omitted variables and 
thereby a biased estimator. We argue our regression model is unbiased due to the relatively 
high R2 overall value of 0.1766. Moreover, our sample consists of 1135 companies and 6810 
observations in total, which makes the suspicions of biasness lower. In addition, the Random 
Effects model shows significant results for all included explanatory variables at a high 
significance level. These further imply that even if we have a biased estimator, our highly 
significant coefficients will make our interpretation more reliable (Wooldridge, 2013).  
 
The following interpretation can be made according to the estimated results in Table 5. PM is 
significant at a 1% significance level and has a positive effect on Tobin’s q. If PM increases 
by one percent, the value of Tobin´s q will increase by 0.144 units. DR is significant at a 1% 
significance level and implies that if the DR increases by one percent, the value of Tobin´s q 
will decrease by 0.245 units, i.e. debt ratio has a negative impact on Tobin's q. Further, the 
variable logSales is significant at a 1% significance level and has a negative impact on 
Tobin’s q. If logSales increases by one percent, the value of Tobin´s q will decrease by 
0.0935 units. The variable logGDP is significant at a 1% significance level and has a positive 
effect on Tobin´s q. More specific, if logGDP increases by one percent, the value of Tobin´s q 
will increase by 0.305 units. The variable State-Ownership Ratio is significant at a 5% 
significance level and has a negative impact on Tobin's q. More specific, if the proportion of 
state ownership in a firm increases by one percent, the value of Tobin´s q will decrease by 
0.0812 units. All estimated values in the Random Effects regression model are also 
economically significant. This as the effect of the included explanatory variables is large 
enough to have a meaningful effect on the dependent variable.  
4.3.3 Interpretation of D06 
The explanatory variable D06 is a dummy variable and will answer our first research 
question. According to the estimation results in Table 5, D06 is significant at a 1% 
significance level and has a positive effect on Tobin´s q. More specific, the value of Tobin´s q 
increases by 0.318 units after the year 2006. This implies the fact that there have occurred 
significant improvements in performance of the SOEs in China after the Split-Share Structure 
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reform was introduced in 2005. This result is in line with our first hypothesis, were 
improvements of the performance of the SOEs were expected after the Split-Share Structure 
reform. As earlier mentioned, the State-Ownership Ratio has decreased due to the reform, 
which suggests that the SOEs have become more privately owned after the Split-Share 
Structure reform. One can therefore draw the conclusion that private ownership has affected 
the SOEs positively. This result aligns with earlier studies in the area where Megginson and 
Neffer (2001) support the assertion that less state owned SOEs are both more efficient and 
profitable. This is also supported by Sun and Tong (2003), who in their research conclude that 
state ownership has a negative effect on performance of the SOEs after a privatization 
process. By abolishing the earlier trading restrictions for state shareholders (Hou and Lee 
2011), the Chinese government has been successful in their attempt to improve the earlier 
unsatisfactory result of the SOEs after the Split-Share Structure reform. Since the state 
shareholders, after the reform, will have a greater interest in increasing the market value of 
the SOEs, the Split-Share Structure reform has benefited minority private shareholders. This 
will further help China to reach their target of an establishment of a modern corporate system.  
 
Chen et.al (2008) suggest in their research that state ownership can be superior under special 
conditions, such as a weak legal environment where the institutional situation is 
underdeveloped. By the estimation results from this study we can conclude that the legal 
environment in China allows for private SOEs to improve their business, since the overall 
effect of the reform is positive where the SOEs are more profitable after the reform, than 
before. The estimation result further implies that the business environment has been 
developed due to the Split-Share Structure reform as the reform has made it easier for the 
SOEs to improve their performance. Furthermore, Boubakri and Cosset (1998) argue that 
competent managers, entrepreneurs and capital are the main factors for a successful 
privatization process. The positive result from this study implies that China possesses these 
important ingredients and that the rapid economic growth seen in China during the last 
decades may have contributed to this success. According to the estimation result from this 
study, where D06 has a positive value implicating significant improvements in performance 
of the SOEs in China after the Split-Share Structure reform, a conclusion can be drawn that 
private ownership is superior to state ownership in consideration to improvements in 
performance.  
	   30	  	  
	  
	  
	   	  
4.3.4 Interpretation of D06xSOR 
The explanatory variable D06xSOR will answer our second research question. This is an 
interaction term including the dummy variable for the year 2006 times the state-ownership 
ratio. D06xSOR is significant at a 1% significance level and has a negative impact on Tobin’s 
q. More specific, the value of Tobin´s q will decrease by 0.267 units for every percent 
increase in state ownership after 2006. As seen in Table 5 above, the value of the interaction 
term, D06xSOR, is more negative than the value of the variable SOR. This implies that the 
effect of state ownership on Tobin´s q after the Split-Share Structure reform is more negative 
than before the reform. This is not in accordance with our second hypothesis, were a less 
negative value of the interaction term, D06xSOR, than for the variable SOR, was expected 
after the Split-Share Structure reform. 
 
The effect of state ownership after the reform was expected to be less negative than before the 
reform, as the main target of the reform was to further liberalize state-owned shares into full 
circulation (Liao et al. 2014). Before the reform, these shares could not be traded on the stock 
market. Although, the fact that state ownership still has a negative effect on performance of 
the SOEs after the Split-Share Structure reform in 2005 aligns with the assertion by Sun and 
Tong (2003), who, suggest that private ownership acts different from state ownership. In 
addition, as earlier discussed by Hou and Lee (2011), the ownership structure has a severe 
impact on a firm’s corporate governance. The fact that private ownership leads to a better 
performing SOE can be explained due to the opposite motives and objectives that face the 
SOEs, depending on whether the SOE is privately or state-owned. When the government is 
more interested in acquiring political credits, the private owners have instead strong interest in 
maximizing the profit of the SOE and thereby increase its market value (Hou and Lee, 2011). 
On the one hand, the motives of the state shareholders and the private shareholders will 
converge after the reform since both parts now benefit from a higher market value of the 
SOE. On the other hand, the effect of the reform is still an ongoing process and the motives 
are therefore not that converged yet. This can explain the more negative value on the 
interaction term, D06xSOR, than for the variable SOR, from the estimation results in Table 5.  
 
The result from this study states that the government still owns a large proportion in many 
SOEs in China. This can be seen in Diagram 1, where the mean value of the state-ownership 
ratio in 2008 still has a remarkably high value, despite the privatization process. If the 
government has a higher interest in acquiring political credits than increase the market value 
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of the firm, the SOE will become less efficient, which has a negative impact on the value of 
Tobin’s q. This explains the negative value of the interaction term, D06xSOR. When a 
company has a high state-ownership ratio, the government is able to manage the firm both 
directly, through the implementation of the government policies, and indirectly by the 
government’s influence over the management team (Hou and Lee, 2011). This implies that 
the motives by the government become the ones dominant in the SOE and, therefore, the 
performance of the SOE is negatively affected.  
4.3.5 Equivocal Result  
The problematic situation regarding the classification scheme and the unclear definitions in 
the owner categories make the results of this study questionable. The government can own a 
SOE in China through both state shares and state-owned legal person shares (Sun and Tong 
2003). According to the classification scheme, these two types of state owners falls into the 
state share and the legal person share categories. This proves that the ownership classification 
scheme fails in clarifying the identity of one type of legal person shareholder, which can 
actually be owned by the government. Therefore, the change in ownership structure towards a 
more privatized ownership structure does not necessarily imply that the SOE is less 
government owned. Thus, the result of this study, where the performance of the SOEs 
decreases the more state owned the SOE becomes, does not necessarily mean that the change 
in performance is due to the privatization. The government in China can still be the dominant 
owner of the SOEs, but in another shape. The results might therefore be equivocal.  
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5. Conclusions and Further Research  
The evidence from this study reveals that the Split-Share Structure reform has had a positive 
impact on the performance of the SOEs in China after the Split-Share Structure reform in 
2005. The State-Ownership Ratio has decreased due to the reform, which suggests that the 
SOEs have become more privately owned after the reform. One can therefore draw the 
conclusion that private ownership has affected the SOEs positive. By abolishing the earlier 
trading restrictions for state shareholders, the Chinese government has been successful in their 
attempt to improve the earlier unsatisfied result of the SOEs. Since the state shareholders, 
after the reform, will have a greater interest in increasing the market value of the SOEs, the 
Split-Share Structure reform has benefitted minority private shareholders. This result can be 
interpreted through the Random Effects model where a dummy variable was included in the 
regression model for year 2006. This dummy variable captured improvements in performance 
of the SOEs after the reform in 2005. 
 
The evidence from this study reveals further that the state ownership ratio has decreased over 
time in line with the Split-Share Structure reform in 2005. It can be stated that state ownership 
has a more negative effect on performance of the SOEs after the Split-Share Structure reform 
in 2005 than before the reform. This was not in accordance with our hypothesis. The fact that 
private ownership leads to a better performing SOE can be explained due to the opposite 
motives and goals that face the firm, depending on whether it is privately or state owned. 
When the private owners have a strong interest in maximizing the profit of the firm and 
thereby increasing its market value, the government is more interested in acquiring political 
credits. After the reform, the motives of the state shareholders and the private shareholders 
will converge since both parts now benefit from a higher market value of the SOE. On the 
other hand, the effect of the reform is still an ongoing process and the motives are therefore 
not that converged yet. Hence the more negative value on the interaction term. This result can 
be interpreted through the Random Effects model where an interaction term was included in 
the regression model including the dummy variable for the year 2006 times the state 
ownership ratio. This interaction term captured if the change in state ownership has a more 
negative effect on the performance of the SOEs after the reform in 2005 than before the 
reform. 
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The result from this study has academically contributed to an empirical study to further 
understand the privatization process in China. The objective of this study is to contribute to 
the already existing privatization theory and also fill the gap of deficiency empirical studies 
that consider the privatization process in China. Further, this study has contributed with an 
input of the overall effect on the performance of the SOEs in China, after the Split-Share 
Structure reform, in consideration to level of state ownership.  
 
This study only investigates the effect of the privatization process on listed SOEs in China. 
For future research, it would therefore be interesting to study the unlisted SOEs in China to 
obtain an even more reliable result. Moreover, it would be interesting to measure the ultimate 
state ownership ratio in consideration to performance of the SOEs and thereby find the 
optimal level of state ownership. Yet another interesting topic for future research would be to 
study the problematic regarding the classification scheme, since the definitions in the owner 
categories are unclear. 
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Appendix 1 
The first stage of the reform started in 1979 to 1983 with the introduction of a more 
decentralized system and profit retention. Instead of the old system where all production and 
capital allocation decisions were centralized from the government, a pilot reform program 
called Gangquan Rangli was introduced. This program enabled SOEs to retain 3% of their 
profits in order to get incentives to improve their productivity and efficiency  (Sun and Tong 
2003). One consequence of Gangquan Rangli was that SOEs now were motivated to bargain 
with the government. Some SOEs even tried to hide their profits from the government, which 
resulted in a decline of government revenues. The government therefore implemented two 
new measures. The first measure introduced SOEs to pay taxes instead of turning in their 
profits to the government. The second measure introduced SOEs to fund their investments 
through borrowing capital from the bank instead of receiving them from the government 
directly. 
 
The second stage of the reform took place between the years 1983 to 1987 and was called 
Bogaidi. This stage made SOEs even more aware of their use of capital, by replacing all 
government allocation to instead borrow all capital from the bank. As a result, the total debt 
ratio of all SOEs was extremely high, for instance in 1994 as high as an average total debt 
ratio of 67.9%. As much as 27.6% of all SOEs had higher total debts than total assets (Wu, 
1997). As a result from the first and second stage of the reform, the SOEs’ paid the bank 
interest instead of paying the government taxes. 
 
As a third stage of the reform the Contractual Management System (Chengbaozhi) took place 
from 1987 to 1992. The main focus in this stage was to separate the government ownership 
from the control of the firms´ operations and the SOEs were therefore allowed free hands to 
operate but had to hand in a certain amount of tax to the government each year. 
 
The last stage, Corporatization, took place in 1992 when the 14th party congress announced 
the establishment of a modern corporate system, with the target of constructing a socialist 
market economy (Sun and Tong 2003).   
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Table 3.b. Descriptive Statistics of the variables over the studied time period 
Variables   2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
Mean  1.390 1.282 1.134 1.257 2.037 1.573 
Tobin´s q Std.Dev 0.381 0.287 0.206 0.308 0.870 0.630 
 
Min 0.374 0.647 0.774 0.622 0.369 0.099 
  Max 5.267 4.988 2.990 3.529 7.182 6.451 
        
 
Mean  0.360 0.380 0.012 0.013 0.048 0.044 
PM Std.Dev 0.245 0.217 0.247 0.293 0.271 0.264 
 
Min -2.905 -2.498 -3.442 -3.191 -2.759 -2.726 
  Max 2.021 1.374 1.105 3.830 2.546 2.436 
        
 
Mean  0.455 0.49 0.517 0.540 0.544 0.544 
DR Std.Dev 0.193 0.192 0.198 0.213 0.223 0.227 
 
Min 0.014 0.009 0.012 0.038 0.029 0.048 
  Max 1.940 1.955 2.041 2.228 2.424 2.360 
        
 
Mean  21.532 21.75 21.88 21.984 22.175 22.297 
logSales Std.Dev 1.212 1.228 1.282 1.324 1.360 1.442 
 
Min 16.687 17.269 17.495 16.957 16.548 16.483 
  Max 25.73 26.055 26.160 26.237 26.346 26.658 
        
 
Mean  11.819 11.982 12.128 12.285 12.491 12.657 
logGDP Std.Dev 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Min 11.819 11.982 12.128 12.285 12.491 12.657 
  Max 11.819 11.982 12.128 12.285 12.491 12.657 
        
 
Mean  0.368 0.358 0.344 0.298 0.266 0.235 
SOR Std.Dev 0.257 0.256 0.252 0.228 0.220 0.216 
 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Max 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.821 0.821 0.971 
 
In Table 3.b above, the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values of all 
variables are presented over the studied time period. By studying the mean value over time, a 
positive trend can be seen in the variables DR, logSales and logGDP, while the variable SOR 
shows a negative trend over the studied time period. DR has a mean value of 0.455 in 2003 
but is slowly increasing to 0.544 in 2008. This means that the Chinese SOEs have increased 
their proportion of debt, by borrowing more capital. Further, a positive trend with a higher 
value in logSales 2008 implies that the SOEs grows and become larger in size over time. 
Also, the positive trend faced in logGDP emphasizes the rapidly growing Chinese economy. 
This can be seen in Table 3.b above, where the logGDP value in 2003 was 11.819 and in 2008 
had increased to 12.657. In contrast, a clear negative trend is seen in the SOR, where the 
mean value in 2003 was 0.368, which has decreased to 0.235 in 2008. This implicates a clear 
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decline of the proportion of state-owned shares in the Chinese SOEs. The largest decline is 
seen after 2005, which implicates an effect of the Split-Share Structure reform in 2005. The 
mean value of Tobin's q and PM have been more fluctuating. Both Tobin’s q and PM shows 
opportunistic numbers after the reform in 2005. 
 
 
 
